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the program; Linda Chanow, a member of the Law Review staff, who
designed the brochures, and Steve Cook, the Managing Editor of the
Law Review, who will be moderating today.
As I said before, we are blessed with a creative and committed student
body. Really, I feel invigorated when I see what they can do. You
should know that sixty percent of the students of this institution say that
they want to study law because they want to create a better world.
I think that when we see the trend toward increasing Darwinism in
international relations and in domestic policies, to see a committed
group of people who believe that with legal knowledge and legal
expertise they can create a better world it is really exciting for all of us.
I also would like to recognize the co-directors of the Program on Law
and Government who conceptualized this program, Professor Tom
Sargentich, who was kind enough to introduce me, and Professorjamin
Raskin.
Both of them really have made a tremendous difference in this
institution. The difference is not just that they have added to the body
of scholarship. They have opened intellectual possibilities for all of us,
in law and government and other areas of intellectual endeavor of the
law school. They have really made a difference, and we are very pleased
and honored that they are a part of this law school.
Again, I want to thank all of you for your presence here. I am
confident that these proceedings will contribute greatly to the dialogue
on voting rights in the District of Columbia.
Thank you very much.
II. WHAT MAKES THE DISTRICT AN ANOMALY?
PROFESSOR SARGENTICH: Our first speaker today is a person
familiar with the history of the District of Columbia. Howard Gillette is
a professor of American civilization and history at George Washington
University, a specialist in Washington, D.C. and U.S. urban, social, and
cultural history.
Professor Gillette is the author of a number of important books in
this area including, Between Justice and Beauty: Race, Planning, and the
Failure of Urban Policy in Washington, D.C.'6 He also co-authored a book
entitled Washington Seen: A Photographic History from 1875 to 1965.17 In
16. HOWARD GImLEr.JR., BETWEENJUSTICE AND BEAuTn. RACE, PLANNING, AND THE FAILURE
OF URBAN PO cYINWASHINGroN, D.C. (1995).
17. FREDRic M Mi.ER & HowARD GxLEr, JR., WASHINGTON SEEN: A PHOTOGRAPHIC
HisTORY, 1875-1965 (1995).
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addition, he is a co-editor of The Divided Metropolis: Social and Spatial
Dimensions of Philadelphia,'8 and has written essays in a wide range of
professional journals.
Professor Gillette also was the founder and first director of the
George Washington Center for Washington Area Studies, and he served
as editor of Washington History for a number of years.
It is a pleasure to introduce Professor Howard Gillette.
PROFESSOR GILLETTE: Good morning. Thank you for the
introduction and the opportunity to share with you today a few
thoughts about the roots of our particular dilemma in the District of
Columbia. Tom mentioned Tocqueville, and I am always reminded
when I hear Tocqueville mentioned of his rather caustic comment
about America's lack of rootedness.
He said, as some of you may remember, that Americans are always
moving on before the roof is on their house. They bury their ancestors
before they are dead.9
We are in a strange situation in a country that is willfully negligent in
understanding the way the past constrains the present. We are living in
a city where an eighteenth-century anomaly has created a constraint
which we are still trying to work through 200 years later.
That particular constraint, as many of you know, is Article I, Section
Eight, Paragraph Seventeen, of the Constitution, which states that,
"Congress shall have Power To exercise exclusive legislation in all Cases
whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may,
by Cession of particular States, and the acceptance of Congress, become
,,20the Seat of the Government of the United States ....
What I want to do today is to talk about the historical context of that
statement and ask why, as our franchise has been broadened step by
step to eliminate every restriction, first by property restrictions, later by
racial restrictions, finally by gender and age and other kinds of
movements in which the franchise has been broadened-why that has
not happened in the District of Columbia.
The answer is quite simple and direct. I think today's session is
directed towards one part of that solution, which is to go to court. A
related point is to raise our political consciousness to grapple with this
situation, which has been at issue for over 200 years.
The origin of exclusive jurisdiction dates back to the eighteenth
18. THE DIVIDED METROPOUS: SOCIAL AND SPATIAL DIMENSIONS OF PILADELPHIA, 1800-1975
(William W. Cutter III & Howard Gillette,jr., eds., 1980).
19. See Letter from Alexis de Tocqueville to Ernest de Chabrul (June 9, 1831), in ALEXIS DE
TOCQuEVIuE, SELECTED LETrERS ON POLTICS AND SOcIEw 38 (Roger Boesche, ed. &James Toupin
& Roger Boesche, trans. 1985) (describingAmerica as "a society without roots, without memories").
20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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century. Fearing any one state would exercise excessive control over
the Capitol should it be located within its confines, congressional
representatives arrived at the concept of exercising their own control
over a permanent federal district.
That determination solidified in 1783 when a number of unpaid
Pennsylvania veterans marched on Congress, then meeting in
Philadelphia, to demand back pay for services rendered during the
American Revolution.
When the state council failed to intervene to assure the members'
safety in the face of the veterans' aggressive demands, Congress
adjourned to reassemble in Princeton, New Jersey. Subsequently,
supporters of strong central government argued for a constitutional
provision granting Congress exclusive jurisdiction over the federal
district.
Under the act that set the Potomac River as the site for the new
federal district,2 ' residents of the states of Maryland and Virginia, living
in the territory ceded to the district, continued to vote in their own
states for the ten years while Philadelphia remained the temporary
capital. With the arrival of Congress in the new District of Columbia in
1800, however, no arrangement had been made to assure for the
representation of residents of the city.
Local critics immediately objected, including Virginia-bom lawyer
Augustus Woodward, who predicted, accurately enough, that it would
be difficult for Congress to mix the affairs of state with the
administration of local concerns.
Responding to such criticism, Congress created a local government
for Washington in 1802,2 providing a charter with a mayor appointed
by the President and a twelve member city council elected by white
male property owners. Other charter revisions followed, most notably
in 1820, providing for the expansion of services and the popular
election of mayor.2
Funding for the new city remained sporadic, however, and both
Georgetown and Alexandria, disgruntled with the obstacles to building
their aspirations as port cities under restrictions placed on them by
Congress, threatened to secede from the District. In 1846, Alexandria
County did just that.
While Washington City Council expressed its concern that the loss to
the District of one-third of its territory threatened its hold on the
national capital, both Congress and the Virginia Assembly approved the
21. SeeGnIuErEsupra note 16,at5.
22. See i at 13.
23. Se id. at 13-14.
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decision.24
Alexandrians celebrated the change, not the least because they
believed Virginia would be more generous than Congress had been in
investing in public works, most notably the extension of its canal system,
in which its aspirations lay as a port city.
The Civil War marked a period of rapid expansion of government
presence in the District of Columbia, as government functions
mushroomed and population grew accordingly. With the ascension of
Radical Republican domination in Congress, Washington was treated as
though it were under Reconstruction.
A Radical Republican mayor, Sayles Bowen, was elected in 1868 with
a boost from the enfranchisement of the city's black male adult
population. He advanced an expansive program of civil rights, as well
as physical improvements to the city. While the Establishment greeted
the latter warmly, given Washington's arrested development before and
during the Civil War, Bowen's embrace of the freedmen created a
backlash within his own party.
In 1870, he was defeated for reelection by another Republican.
Within the year, Congress enacted an entirely new system, a territorial
government which restricted the franchise precisely as it had been
exercised before by making the governor and the upper body of the
legislature appointments of the president.2 Only a lower house of
representatives remained popularly elected.
The key figure, as many of you know, of this new government was
Alexander Shepherd. Although he was not named governor, he
became the power in the new territory by exercising control over a
massively funded board of public works. In 1872, questions arose as to
whether or not he had overspent his authority. Congress had an
investigation, and he was rapped on the knuckles for overspending and
given a limit of ten million dollars to spend in the coming year.5
When again he exceeded his authority, Congress intervened,
removing not only Shepherd's power over public works, but also ending
the elected franchise entirely by establishing a temporary commission
appointed by the President to take charge of the District of Columbia.27
In 1878, Congress made that commission permanent, thereby
eliminating the last vestiges of popular election in the District of
Columbia.28
24. See id. at 22-23.
25. See id. at 59-60.
26. Se id at 63.
27. See id. 63-65.
28. See id. at 70-71.
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Interestingly enough, the local press accepted the changing
governance, not the least because it carried with it the first formal
commitment by the Federal Government to make an annual payment
towards District expenses, a rate set at the time at fifty percent of those
costs.29
In subsequent years, Washington found many defenders for the
arrangement because they considered it more efficient than the
corrupt city rule which was identified with such big city machines as
those known and described in New York and Philadelphia."0
In 1901 District Commissioner Henry Macfarland extolled the virtues
of the city's "ideal form of government." "The fact that it is an
exception to all other governments in the United States," he said, "in
that it provides for taxation without representation and is autocratic in
form, grieves some good people in the District who care more for
sentiment than for substance .... Self government of the most direct
and effective character is in the possession of the people of the District
of Columbia .... [It is] admittedly the best in the United States,
because it is a government by the best citizens."
31
Washington continued to receive a measure of positive reviews for its
unique and undemocratic system of governance. But starting in the
1930s, sufficient concern about the effectiveness of such a system
prompted a number of critical studies; thirty between 1934 and 1941
alone.
Among the concerns were that the commissioner form of
government failed to separate administrative and legislative ftnctions; it
divided responsibilities between too many independent and federal
agencies; and it responded more readily to the interests of individual
members of Congress than to local citizen concerns.
As early as 1929, a Brookings Institution study recommended that
federal officers be relieved of all responsibility for duties that pertained
to the affairs of the District.
The system had become entrenched, however, and neither the Board
of Trade, which was the chief power in the local scene, nor key
members of Congress wanted to change it The Board of Trade favored
some form of representation in Congress, but it strongly opposed any
return to local self-governance. While the United States Senate
approved home rule bills five times between 1949 and 1960, the House
District Committee prevented the bills from ever reaching a vote on the
House floor.
.29. Seeid.
30. See.idat70.
31. StevenJ. Diner, The City Under the Hil, 8 WASHINGTON HISTORY 55, 57 (1996).
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It took the power of national attention, coming as a part of the Civil
Rights Movement, to provide the impetus for home rule momentum.
In 1967 President Lyndon Johnson asked his special assistant for
District affairs, Charles Horsky, to fashion a bill on Capitol Hill to
provide for an elected city council. When Horsky failed to get the
support he needed, Johnson created by executive order an appointed
city council of nine persons and a mayor-commissioner to replace the
old board of commissioners
3 2
Johnson's plan gained the support of local activists as the best that
could be expected immediately. But efforts continued to secure true
home rule in the following year. In 1969 Congress named a new
commission headed by Representative Anchor Nelson, Republican of
Minnesota to study the problem. Its report, published in August 1972,
urged a thorough reorganization of District government."
Coincidentally, the strongest opponent of home rule, House District
Chairman John McMillan, was defeated in the South Carolina
Democratic primary.
Congress finally passed home rule legislation in December 1973,
providing for the election of a mayor and city council of thirteen
members.3 Responding to continuing desires in Congress to exercise
control over the city, however, it retained the rights to approve the city
budget and to approve all legislation passed by the council."5 It also
prohibited the city from taxing federal property or the income of
commuters working in the city.3 6  Although there were those who
criticized the new plan, as in 1967, it was generally accepted as the best
arrangement Washington citizens could hope for, and the proposal
passed in a 1974 referendum by 83,000 to 18,000 opposed.
The Home Rule Act appeared to be working well enough in the early
years. As a consequence, interest shifted to representation in Congress.
A constitutional amendment granting the right to have representation
passed Congress in 1978. 37 But when the necessary two-thirds of the,
states failed to ratify it, interest in Washington shifted to converting
Washington to a state.
In 1982 local residents elected a statehood convention which
fashioned a constitution for the state of New Columbia and got it
approved by initiative by a margin of 60,000 to 53,000 votes. The
32. SeeGiw-iE. , supra note 16, at 179.
33. See id. at 180.
34. See id. at 190.
35. See id. 190-91.
36. See id. at 190.
37. See Louis Michael Seidman, The Preconditionsfor Home Rule, 39 CATH. U. L REV. 373, 376
n.10 (1990).
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constitution contained a number of controversial elements, and as a
consequence it was modified before finally being presented to
Congress. Although the House District Committee voted out the bill
that year, it did not come to a full vote on the floor until November
1993, when it was defeated by a vote of 277 to 153.3
Another approach to altering Washington's governance, retrocession
to Maryland, which had been discussed intermittently for years, gained
renewed attention in 1996 with the creation of an advocacy group, the
Committee for the Capital City. Following Mayor Barry's dramatic
statement in February of 1995 that the city could no longer afford to
sustain state functions, critics took a renewed look at retrocession as a
way of sorting out local and state functions. Given the District's
precarious financial position and mutual suspicion between leaders of
the two jurisdictions, however, retrocession did not generate any
immediate political support.
In 1997, in spite of Mayor Marion Barry's suggestion earlier,
President Clinton proposed and Congress adopted a series of measures
to take over some functions that traditionally had been considered state
responsibilities, the cost of which was borne by the District of Columbia.
In the process, of course, as many of you know, Senator Lauch Faircloth
inserted a provision which removed the last real operating control of
the mayor over District affairs, thus again eliminating much of the
impetus for home rule.39
In assessing where we are today, it seems necessary to develop a
narrative which can allow us to come to a reasonable solution to this
impasse that has existed for such a long period of time. From that
narrative one could hope to have some kind of reasonable solution, not
just assuring the right to vote, which seems to be uncontested in
essence, but more particularly to determine what direction to proceed.
On the one hand, there is an empowerment narrative, which exists
today, especially as it relates to linkage between home rule and the Civil
Rights Movement from the mid-1950s, when the city achieved majority
black status, to the present. The logical outcome of this strategy is
statehood, for it is the one device that both assures basic rights to all
residents and maximizes autonomy to the city's majority black residents.
It is in effect an affirmative action strategy, for it would convert a place
38. SeeGILLETrE, supra note 17, at 206.
39. See 143 CONG. REC. S9898 (Sept. 24, 1998) (introducing the provision making funding for
the District of Columbia conditioned upon approval by the District of Columbia Financial
Responsibility and Management Assistance Authority). For a discussion on the Financial
Responsibility and Management Assistance Authority, see Stephen R. Cook, Comment, Tough Love
in the District: Management Reform Under the District of Columbia Tnancial Responsibiliy and Management
AssistanceAc4 47 AM. U. L. REV. 993 (1998).
1999]
AMERICAN UNIVERSrIY LAW REVIEW
widely recognized as a city to a state, setting a new precedent for
representation, if not by population, by limited geographic extent and
resources.
A second narrative stresses national goals and, at least in its rhetoric,
places higher value on efficiency and rationalization. It extends the
inherently paternalistic relationship built into the concept of exclusive
jurisdiction and thus justifies the imposition of unelected bodies on a
previously unrepresented constituency in the name of some larger
national good.
As in any hegemonic system, it is not unusual to find local residents
buying into the concept because they have come to absorb the values
and outlook of their oppressors. One should recognize that this is
precisely what happened in 1874. While civil rights activists objected to
the loss of the franchise to an appointed commission, the
Establishment, including the press as well as Congress, accepted this in
return for the guaranteed federal payment that was paid out. The
logical outcome of such a view is precisely what we have today, an
autocracy in the form of a control board, which without plans to
institute full representation with its removal can hardly be considered
benevolent. The logic of this view is not, I must add, retrocession,
though it has been suggested at times that it would be.
Let me close by posing a counter-factual proposition that highlights
the absurdity of the status quo. Even as Alexandria's retrocession was
being debated in the 1840s, critics warned that the loss of this territory
would be disastrous to the capital's defense should the South secede.
When that happened, one of the first acts of the Federal Government
was to occupy that territory militarily.
Later, and over the years, the desirability of bringing Alexandria
County back into the District on a permanent basis has been stated on a
number of occasions. The one time the Supreme Court reviewed this
issue, it refused to comment on the merits, arguing that this was
working well enough as it is.'
But suppose the control board deemed it essential to the District of
Columbia's fiscal health that the territory lost to Virginia be
reintegrated into the District of Columbia? This is not so entirely far
fetched because the Board of Trade, for a number of years, has seen the
possibility and promoted the idea of a single District of Columbia within
the city of Washington within the beltway as a whole.
Suppose this happened, though, and one of the residents of Virginia
declared their intention to vote for a member of the United States
40. SeePhillips v. Payne, 92 U.S. 130 (1875).
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